It follows from the nature of alliances that their evolvement is burdened by tensions. This is especially true of arrangements that bind fully sovereign entities together and whose primary aim is the protection of independence. Accordingly, compared to NATO, the Warsaw Pact had fewer crisis but the ones that broke out –Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Solidarnost - proved explosions. Tito’s break with Moscow does not entirely fit the list, as formally Yugoslavia’s relationship to the USSR has been bilateral. Meanwhile, since 1949, NATO’s internal dissonances were audible while they never led to the deafening rumble of the WP’s dissonances. 

De Gaulle’s order that NATO leave French soil is not comparable to the turmoils in the alliance that legalized Soviet domination. The only opposition the General encountered has been one of the best comebacks of history. The US’ ambassador responded to the demand that “everything must go” by asking whether the graves of those that liberated France should also be removed. For lesser offences, the Kremlin removed national leaders. Outstanding is the case of Imre Nagy, who, once pushed, declared neutrality and Hungary’s exit of the WP. Nagy was hung for treason and other trifle charges. Such discrepancies discredit those that compare the WP and NATO to declare them analogous products of the Cold War. The distortion of the facts is not an accidental. The seeming error serves a purpose. It is to undermine the legitimacy of the Atlantic Alliance and to imply that, with the WP gone, NATO, should also be formally abandoned.

In its last issue, Duly Noted has dealt with the decay within NATO. In doing so, the piece concentrated on Germany’s case. After that posting, Mr. Gates, the departing Secretary of Defense, has devoted his final policy speech to the problems of the alliance. The lecture concluded that, due to the members’ abuses, NATO might face a “dismal future”. It gives significance to the terminology what Mr. Gates intended to achievewith his report. The swan-song testimony represented no political ambition but rather the personal concerns of a public servant whose value is proven by his service in two American administrations. Thus, the report is a summary of troubling experiences that resulted in the warning of a pilot about to leave the ship. 

Precisely because the address got less attention where its intended audience is located, the salient points deserve to be reconstructed. 

Since NATO’s founding, the world has changed. Originally, there has been a clear threat by an easily defined enemy. Appearances suggest that the Alliance has defeated its foe and that this makes a tightly knitted organization superfluous. The assumption of victory due to a common effort might be pleasing but that does not put the claim beyond debate. Whether the Soviet threat was overcome because of NATO or in spite of its weaknesses is, at best, an open question. Today’s challenges are still subtle and thus easy to ignore. However, its the roots are sunk in fertile soil. Upon maturity, the foe will become as challenging, as was Communism - another faith relying on a mighty army. 

Besides self-confidence derived from a seeming success and a blinfolded sense of security, there is another vicissitude that follows from the difference between 1949 and the present. At the time of the treaty’s launch, Europe has been in ruins and America, in relative terms, at the peak of her global power. Accordingly, the US bore the bulk of the association’s burden and she acted as the protector of a war- weakened region. In ‘49 reality imposed a one-sided division of the obligations. Ergo, the treaty served to provide a formal foundation for America’s protective intervention and included a warning that Europe’s entities were not easy targets of aggression.

Sixty years of protected progress under the American umbrella, restored a natural material balance within the alliance. In terms of population, GDP and defensive potential, Europe achieved more than parity with the USA. While this is a major achievement of the compact, it also outdates NATO’s accustomed “division of labor”. Nowadays there seems to be no reason why America should continue to pull the cart. Nor is it apparent why Europe’s main contribution should be to criticize Washington’s efforts from the elevated view provided by the perch on the coach.  

The “above politics” wisdom of Gates –the White House states that he did not speak for the Administration- justifies a summary. The more so, since this signal of a potential turning point, received less attention than it deserves.

The burdens of sustaining the alliances from its, albeit large, national base and its costs encumber a tiring America. The continued engagement in behalf of allies that do less than their condition would allow and that refuse to be “partners” when inputs are demanded, cuts the “appetite” to continue the arrangement. America’s disproportionate defense spending is a subsidy of Europe’s generous social programs. A new generation of Americans is apt to rebel, as they might “not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost”. 

The frustration that drives the warning is understandable. In Afghanistan, the reservations of European governments have limited their participation. In Libya, while formally supporting the prevention what amounts to “self genocide”, most of NATO remains in effect neutral. Active members have shown that even against a negligible régime such as Kaddafi’s, their mobilizable means were as insufficient as was their political will. This short breath is no surprise. Defense expenditures have been neglected as - due in part to America’s resigned acceptance- it could be assumed that the “senior partner” has no choice but to defend “Europe”.  No wonder that, in Gates’ words “despite two millions in uniform, NATO has struggled to sustain the deployment of 25-45’000 troops in boots on the ground but also in support assets”. 

Projected against that screen, the forecast is expectable. “The reality is that there will be dwindling appetite in the American body politic to extend precious funds in behalf of nations that are unwilling to devote the resources to be serious partners in their own defense.” From the implied attempt to remain uncommitted even in matters that concern them, follows that “what I have sketched out is the possibility for a dim, if not dismal future of the trans-Atlantic alliance”. Then, consolingly “the members “have it within their means to halt these trends”. Therefore, if the security arrangement is to continue, “The drift of the past years cannot continue”.

Presenting the case for the limited utility of the hollowed out alliance seems to be an overdue service. If taken seriously, it calls attention to a pressing problem in need of a solution. In the case of the USA, here her alternatives to NATO as it is must be considered. The more so, since significant segments of the allied populations prefer to see the enemy in America, and not in movements that questions their right to their way of life. The issue boils down to whether there are alternatives. Is the US condemned to defend countries that are unwilling to exert themselves and that prefer to be “neutral” while their own business is straightened out for them? 

Her global interest and responsibilities make America interested in solid bridges to a vigorous Europe. This makes some allies and bonds indispensable even if she must prepare herself for more unilateralism. In the pursuit of this goal, it is advisable to wager on the strong. In doing so, the alternative beyond NATO is a series of bilateral commitments. These should involve countries that, as partners, appreciate security guarantees that surpass their national means to protect an independence that, due to their experience, they do not take for granted.