Will the Germans Open Fire on the Russians over Kosovo?

From the desk of The Brussels Journal on Wed, 2008-02-20 10:35

A quote from Prof. Stephen Bainbridge at his blog, 18 February 2008

[I]f Russia decided to oppose Kosovan independence with armed force, could it? A look at a map shows that the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union leaves Russia with no obvious land route by which its troops could intervene. With the Russian Air Force’s sizeable inventory of AN-124s, however, one may assume that Russia could airlift some forces into Serbia. […]

[A]n article by George Friedman [...] reminds us that:

[...] [In 1999] The United States prevailed on the Russians to initiate diplomatic contacts [to end the war in Kosovo] and persuade the Serbs that their position was isolated and hopeless. The carrot was that the United States agreed that Russian peacekeeping troops would participate in Kosovo. […] This ended the war, but the Russians were never permitted — let alone encouraged — to take their role in Serbia. The Russians were excluded from the Kosovo Force (KFOR) decision-making process and were isolated from NATO’s main force. When Russian troops took control of the airport in Pristina in Kosovo at the end of the war, they were surrounded by NATO troops.

Friedman argues that this seemingly minor incident had major consequences that continue to reverberate to this day:

The degree to which Yeltsin’s humiliation in Kosovo led to the rise of Vladimir Putin is not fully understood. Putin represented a faction in the intelligence-military community that regarded Kosovo as the last straw. […] If Kosovo is granted independence outside the context of the United Nations, where Russia has veto power, [Putin] will be facing the same crisis Yeltsin did. If he repeats Yeltsin’s capitulation, he will face substantial consequences. […] It is not so much what Putin wants as the consequences for Putin if he does not act. He cannot afford to acquiesce. He will create a crisis.

What sort of crisis? Friedman explores a couple of options, including this scenario:

Assume that Putin would send a battalion or two of troops by air to Belgrade, load them onto trucks and send them toward Pristina, claiming this as Russia’s right under agreements made in 1999. Assume a squadron of Russian aircraft would be sent to Belgrade as well. A Russian naval squadron, including the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, already is headed to the Mediterranean. Obviously, this is not a force that could impose anything on NATO. But would the Germans, for example, be prepared to open fire on these troops?
 
If that happened, there are other areas of interest to Russia and the West where Russia could exert decisive military power, such as the Baltic states. If Russian troops were to enter the Baltics, would NATO rush reinforcements there to fight them? The Russian light military threat in Kosovo is that any action there could lead to a Russian reaction elsewhere.

KFOR currently has about 15,000 troops from a whopping 34 nations. Eyeballing the national components, however, suggests that only the US, UK, German, French, and Italian components are likely to have any serious combat capabilities.

So suppose a couple of Russian air deployable battalions fly into Belgrade and then deploy into Northern Kosovo to protect the Serbian enclaves in that area, occupying the bridges over the River Ibar in towns like Mitrovica. How might NATO respond?

One problem is that the USA and UK are already facing serious problems of imperial overstretch. […] US news reports suggest that the US contingent in KFOR consists mainly of National Guard troops. Many of the USA’s active combat units are tied down in Iraq or Afghanistan, preparing to deploy, or recovering from a deployment. If things go south in Kosovo, who goes?

In Reply to marcfrans RE: "Putin's poodle?"

Submitted by Kapitein Andre on Fri, 2008-02-22 07:39.

I. The Vooruzhyónniye síly Rossíyskoy Federátsii has been described by President Putin himself as "an unwieldy and extravagant military machine". Despite Putin's efforts, it is still far from the volunteer professional force he envisions: one that is considerably smaller, more efficient, cohesive and effective. However, its capabilities for power projection have diminished from the global to the regional level. The Russian military budget as of 2008 is the 7th largest internationally, terribly far behind the European Union and United States, and roughly 50% of that of France. Certainly Russia demonstrated "political will" under both Yeltsin and more significantly under Putin to maintain Russian territorial integrity (e.g. Chechnia), a military presence in the post-Soviet space (e.g. "peacekeepers" in Transnistria and Abkhazia, bases in Central Asia, pacts with Belarus, etc.) and the role of a Great Power in global affairs e.g. resolving the Balkan crises. However, to use a familiar cliché, Russia's bark has been louder than its bite. The Russian armed forces have plenty of corruption and inexperience but are severely lacking in: morale, equipment, spare parts, fuel, discipline, amenities and proper command-and-control. Furthermore, its economy is dependent upon high commodity prices, namely for oil and gas. It is far more dependent on the economies of the EU for export markets than these are on Russia for energy imports. Thus, I maintain my original point that circumstances have forced Russian military doctrine to rely upon nuclear weapons, and its hard and soft power to rely upon the threat of using them.

 

II. The West has "forced" Russia into its particular position because it has encroached into the traditional Russian preserve or sphere of influence. You will note that NATO expansion in East-Central Europe has created a veritable cordon sanitaire around Russia, who can only rely upon Belarus. Moreover, NATO continues to regard Russia as a threat, albeit a reduced one after 1991-1993. Perhaps Russia is receiving its "just desserts" for centuries of armed aggression and expansion under the Tsars and later the Soviets. Nonetheless, Western geopolitical manoeuvres have resulted in the perceived humiliation of both Russia and Serbia, the likes of which was visited upon Germany in the aftermath of the Great War. Obviously Serbia is far nearer to Germany in this context than Russia is. However, it is clear that both Russia and Serbia seek respect and dignity in regional and global affairs, and neither the post-Soviet nor post-Yugoslav spaces, respectively, will be peaceful and prosperous until this is accomplished.

III. Actually I am reasonably certain that Russia's missiles are targeting the world's oceans, mainly because of the collapse and disintegration of their C-in-C and detection systems. These problems nearly resulted in two accidental launches of Russian ICBMs during the early-mid 1990s. Indeed, a nuclear exchange was probably more likely under Yeltsin's tenure than any other time in history, even if it would have been accidental. Since then, the missles were targeted elsewhere in order to prevent such a disaster from occurring again, although they can of course be re-targeted if Moscow is certain of an incoming barrage.

Putin's poodle?

Submitted by marcfrans on Thu, 2008-02-21 16:55.

@ Kapitein Andre

I take issue with three assertions in your last paragraph.

1) I doubt that Russia's "non-WMD power" is "impotent".   Such power is almost always largely a matter of political will, and in a petro-power it is certainly not a matter of lack of 'resources'. 

2) Even if it were impotent, it is questionable that Western powers "forced" Russia in such a position.  The West offered Russia membership in the G-7 and helped opening the doors to its integration with the world economy.  The current absence of 'rule of law' in Russia is not of the West's making.  

3) You do NOT know where Russia's warheads are targeted (despite Putin's recent threat to target Poland and another east-European country), nor do you know where America's are targeted, and neither do I.  That is a good thing, and it better remain so.  

RE: "Will the Germans Open Fire on the Russians over Kosovo?"

Submitted by Kapitein Andre on Thu, 2008-02-21 09:39.

In Resonse to Stephen Bainbridge:

 

Firstly, I need to point out the substantial decline of Russian conventional military power since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and during the Yeltsin administration, and of more import, Russia's ability to project that power. The conduct of the Russian armed forces during its forays into Chechnia demonstrate complete ignorance of the Revolution in Military Affairs that has dominated Western and increasingly Chinese strategic and tactical thought. Certainly the type of asymmetrical warfare waged by the Chechen paramilitaries has not lost its infuriating qualities in the decades since Vietnam, as Coalition forces are discovering in the dusty streets of Baghdad and the ragged foothills of Afghanistan. However, had the Russian military become professional, progressive and implemented the RMA, the casualty statitistics would be rather less embarassing.

 

Secondly, over whose territory is Russia to ferry paratroops? The Serb Republic is landlocked. Moreover, it is mysteriously distanced from Russian aid by a cordon sanitare of NATO countries, from Poland to Turkiye. It is one thing to violate Bosnian airspace; it is quite another to violate NATO's.

 

In Response to George Friedman:

 

I fully agree that for domestic purposes Putin cannot ignore Kosovar sovereignty. That the Kosovar Albanians received explicit support from the United States, NATO and the EU, lent the impression to Moscow that it was being dismissed as a Great Power. Nor are Western politicians and bureaucrats ignorant of Russian support for and interest in the Serb nation for over a century. Furthermore, equally long-standing Russian efforts to unite and lead the Slavic peoples, in particular the Eastern and Southern ones are dashed.

 

However, I challenge Russia's capacity to deploy further military forces to Serbia or Kosovo for aforementioned reasons and its capacity to successfully invade the Baltic states. The Russian military cannot occupy Chechnia let alone Estonia. The Baltic nations are quite fierce as regards their self-determination, and the Forest Brothers resisted Soviet occupation for decades.

 

Ultimately, Russia's clout is limited to its nuclear arsenal. Unfortunately, Western countries have forced Russia into a position wherein its non-WMD power is impotent. However, as far as I know, Russia's warheads remain targeted on the oceans, while American ones long for Moscow and Beijing. In this context, Putin's declarations can be interpreted as pleas to not further humiliate his nation.

at some point in the 90's

Submitted by pashley on Thu, 2008-02-21 07:20.

I'm sure there were people on the US side who thought supporting Kosovo independence was a non-issue with little consequences.    Hmmm, chickens coming home to roost.   

 

Real clarity and vision on any foreign policy question is, of course, hugely difficult.   So lacking any real genius at the diplomatic and intelligence communities, a short-hand solution might to be to oppose the any designs of Tranzi programs like the EU, UN, and WB. 

A war on three fronts?

Submitted by Lancelot Owen on Wed, 2008-02-20 20:16.

Apart from the very real possibility of outright conflict as outlined above, the Serbians and their Russian allies could also import the tactics used by Iran against coalition forces in the Middle East and launch a sustained, low-level insurgency against K-FOR troops in Kosovo using ‘irregular‘ forces.

Surely this ‘Iranian model’ of frequent attacks on occupying forces with I.E.D.s, rocket-propelled grenades, car bombs and light machine guns is the most likely way the Serbs and Russians could cause serious trouble for the West.

The populations of Western Europe and America are already weary of seeing their young men and women dying in far off lands, fighting battles that aren’t theirs, in the vain hope of imposing some sort of leftist, multi-cultural, politically correct worldview on countries that do not want it. Seeing their young soldiers being killed and wounded in yet another violent counter-insurgency campaign [in addition to the two they are already involved in] would surely be the straw that breaks the camel’s back. The calls to bring the troops home would be deafening. The Russians and Serbians must know this.

just wait

Submitted by kappert on Wed, 2008-02-20 15:15.

No hurry for the Russians. The unilateral declaration will cause violence within Kosovo and we'll see how kfor will act on this. The credibility of UN decreased even more. Only when NATO decides to upgrade Kosovo's 'army' and withdraw their own personal, Russia will upgrade the Serb forces. Then it's getting hotter.

All this over Kosovo?

Submitted by Bosch Ferretti on Wed, 2008-02-20 15:07.

Whatever the final scenario turns out to be, it is extraordinary to think that the US, UK and Germany are on the side of a breakaway Muslim enclave and the Russians on the side Western Civ.  Consider the fate of Christendom if Barack Hussein Obama is elected President, Turkey is admitted to the EU and the Lisbon Treaty becomes law - all within a few years.  It's as if the Devil has a hand in our affairs...