The Future Face of Geopolitics

From the desk of Marc Huybrechts on Fri, 2007-08-03 17:40

In an earlier essay I noted that the preponderant nature of war had been changing over the past half century or so, from international wars between states to civil wars within states. History does not suggest that this state of affairs will continue forever.   Indeed, liberal democracy faces currently two major challenges: (A) the terrorism emanating from radical Islam and (B) the renewed rise of non-democratic great powers. The first threat is the more immediate one. But, it is the lesser of the two, because it originates in stagnant and backward societies that are largely living on the economic rent from natural resources and that pose no military threat to developed societies.  However, their potential use of acquired weapons of mass destruction does present a serious and growing menace.  Nevertheless, it is the second threat in the form of the return of authoritarian great powers (specifically China and Russia), that is likely to be the major threat to liberal democracy’s survival in the foreseeable future.      

The Recent Past  

The past century has witnessed three major great power struggles (the two world wars and the Cold War) and liberal democracy emerged victorious in all three.   Historians and political scientists have advanced many hypotheses (specific to each conflict) in attempts to explain this positive development.  But, it would be a mistake to think that democracy prevailed because of (1) any presumed greater cooperative spirit (of alliance) among democratic regimes than among other types of regimes, or because of (2) any presumed ideological superiority (in terms of being ‘inspiring’ to the masses, or of having a ‘moral high ground’), or (3) because of any presumed inherent economic advantage of liberal democracy over political authoritarianism.  No, the non-democratic capitalist adversaries of democracy (Germany and Japan), were ultimately defeated in WW2 because of their limited resource bases (being medium-sized countries), and communism failed in the 20th century because the inherent inefficiencies of communist economies prevented the Soviet Union and China from fully exploiting their vast resources and ‘catching up’ with the democratic West.            

It was the emergence of the United States, as an economic and military power, that gave liberal democracy the edge in the great struggles with authoritarianism over the past century.  While many factors help explain the ‘American exception’, it should be a sobering thought that history’s ‘judgment’ (by later generations) on the performance of liberal democracy would likely have been very different had there not been the U.S. factor.  Just like the Greeks soured on ‘democracy’ in the wake of Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War in the 4th century BC.     

The Present

Not only did liberal democracy prevail in its great trials of the 20th century, but also capitalism (as opposed to command economies) has been ascendant, particularly in the second half of the century, with greater adherence to market principles in a growing number of countries.  The most important examples, of course, were: (1) the removal of ‘internal’ trade barriers attendant to the European integration process, and (2) partial economic liberalization in the world’s two largest countries, China and India, since the early 1980’s and 90’s respectively.   In addition, early democratization efforts and attempts to establish genuine ‘rule of law’ in Russia (following the collapse of the Soviet Union) have failed, in large measure because high prices of natural resources have ‘enabled’ the renewed strengthening of centralized state power.  As a result, the world is witnessing today the return of major authoritarian ‘capitalist’ states, particularly in China and Russia, which can represent an alternative path to ‘modernity’ for a growing number of countries elsewhere in the world.   Francis Fukuyama’s famous ‘end-of-history’ hypothesis, with its implied inevitability of liberal democracy’s future dominance, is very much in doubt today.    

The Future

The future is unknown.  But, history provides a useful guide.  The future face of geopolitics is likely going to resemble that of the past, i.e. of an intermittent – but endlessly recurring - struggle between forces of (relative) freedom and forces of (seductive) authoritarianism.  That is why the contemporary return of great authoritarian powers is ominous and dangerous.   It means in practice that a universal “democratic peace” will remain a pipedream.  

It is (1) often argued that authoritarian/totalitarian regimes inevitably breed high levels of favoritism and unaccountability, and therefore prove to be inferior economically and militarily in the long run.  It is (2) also claimed (or, rather, hoped) that authoritarian capitalist regimes will tend to democratize after passing a certain threshold of development.  In a recent article in the July/August issue of the magazine Foreign Affairs, entitled The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers, the Israeli academic Azar Gat examined these and other claims.   He notes that higher levels of social discipline can offset the inefficiencies of favoritism and of unaccountability, and that a transition to democracy by today’s authoritarian capitalist powers is not inevitable.   Indeed, some of the differences between now and much of the past century are striking.   For instance, the previous totalitarian capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were crushed in war and threatened by soviet power, and subsequently lent themselves to major restructuring and democratization.  Also, many smaller countries that chose capitalism (and to some extent also ‘democracy’) over communism, did so in part because of the absence of a serious rival economic and political model and also because of Western liberal hegemony on the world stage.  Today’s geopolitical situation is quite different.   China and Russia represent a return of economically successful authoritarian capitalist powers, but they are much larger (and thus potentially much stronger) than the defeated authoritarian capitalist great powers of the previous century.     The risk is real that a powerful authoritarian capitalist order is emerging in the world that “allies political elites, industrialists and the military” (writes Gat).  Such an order is likely to be ‘nationalistic’ in a negative sense, i.e. in the sense that it will not favor liberal democracy and individual freedom.

In Reply to Marc Huybrechts

Submitted by Kapitein Andre on Mon, 2007-08-06 23:33.

Huybrechts: "...liberal democracy faces currently two major challenges: (A) the terrorism emanating from radical Islam and (B) the renewed rise of non-democratic great powers...it is the second threat in the form of the return of authoritarian great powers (specifically China and Russia), that is likely to be the major threat to liberal democracy’s survival in the foreseeable future."

 

Liberal democracy also faces another major challenge, that of demographic change. Muslims residing in Western countries reject liberal democracy because it: (a) is not socially conservative enough, (b) could be replaced by Islamic theocracy according to fundamentalists, and (c) is inferior to the social democratic welfare state, economically speaking. Furthermore, the vast majority of non-Muslim migrants, legal and not, do not have the necessary strength of character (hard work, honesty, high savings) or values (education, self-sufficiency, responsibility) to make liberal democracy work. Regarding China and Russia, the former is insular except where its economic development is concerned and the latter is weak and confused.

 

Huybrechts: "...the non-democratic capitalist adversaries of democracy (Germany and Japan), were ultimately defeated in WW2 because of their limited resource bases (being medium-sized countries), and communism failed in the 20th century because the inherent inefficiencies of communist economies prevented the Soviet Union and China from fully exploiting their vast resources and ‘catching up’ with the democratic West."

 

Agreed. However, the Soviet Union was very much dependent upon Ukrainian natural resources, infrastructure and industry, which it would not have possessed had it transformed into a liberal democracy, at which point the Ukraine would have seceded. Secondly, Germany and Japan posed a military threat that contemporary Russia and China do not. Had Germany efficiently allocated the resources of non-Soviet Europe, it could have economically competed with both the United States and the Soviet Union; moreover, it nearly conquered the European half of the latter.

 

Huybrechts: "...early democratization efforts and attempts to establish genuine ‘rule of law’ in Russia (following the collapse of the Soviet Union) have failed, in large measure because high prices of natural resources have ‘enabled’ the renewed strengthening of centralized state power."

 

Actually the failure of Russian liberal democracy was caused by: (a) Gorbachev's rapid allowance of economic and political freedom, and (b) Yeltsin's transition to capitalism without an adequate legal system, political mechanisms or economic safeguards. Indeed, China's cautious foray into capitalism has proved immensely more successful. 

Huybrechts: "The future face of geopolitics is likely going to resemble that of the past, i.e. of an intermittent – but endlessly recurring - struggle between forces of (relative) freedom and forces of (seductive) authoritarianism."

 

It is a naive generalisation to claim that geopolitical struggle is merely one between freedom and unfreedom.

 

Huybrechts: "It is (1) often argued that authoritarian/totalitarian regimes inevitably breed high levels of favoritism and unaccountability, and therefore prove to be inferior economically and militarily in the long run.  It is (2) also claimed (or, rather, hoped) that authoritarian capitalist regimes will tend to democratize after passing a certain threshold of development."

 

It would be more correct that such regimes would be forced to become more socio-economically equitable and moderate politically, although neither development would necessarily be liberal democratic.

 

Huybrechts: "China and Russia represent a return of economically successful authoritarian capitalist powers, but they are much larger (and thus potentially much stronger) than the defeated authoritarian capitalist great powers of the previous century."

 

Not really, for the reasons mentioned above. Secondly, the Russian nuclear arsenal is dwindling and decaying, and China maintains a relatively small one (200) that is entirely defensive and countervalue and could not hope to match the American counterforce/value (10,000), which includes 400 warheads aimed at targets in and around Moscow alone.

Missing the mark # 3

Submitted by marcfrans on Sun, 2007-08-05 00:07.

@ Sonomaca

1) I agree with the basic tenor of your comments about India.   Perhaps you agree with me that the world appears to be slowly moving to a future conflict between the democratic alliance of India+USA+Japan+Australia and the coming China-Eurabia axis.

2) But, what is the relevance of your specific comments about China and Russia?  The "facts" you cite do not "demonstrate" your conclusion, and the latter is certainly not a "fact" but rather a hope or wish on your part.   How do you know that "China will never even come close to challenging the United states"?   Have you made an historical analysis of the totalitarian mind, have you?  Apparently not.

In the article the point was made (indirectly) that the resource bases of the great capitalist authoritarian states of the past century (Germany and Japan) were much smaller than those of the current rising ones.  Moreover, it is not even of great importance (for the purpose of the argument made in the article) whether the economies and militaries of the 'new' authoritarians will exceed those of the United States or not.  In the second world war the resource bases of the axis and the allies were certainly 'mismatched' in favor of the allies.   But do you think the American public is willing to fight another genuine world war to find out? 

 

3) No, the relevant consideration is to study the past for clues about the behavior of totalitarian great powers (irrespective of any possible resource-mismatch) under a variety of circumstances.  And then it should be obvious that liberal democracy faces renewed severe "risks" (not necessarily defeat).

Missing the mark # 2

Submitted by marcfrans on Sat, 2007-08-04 23:35.

@ missingmyumlauts

For a possible petty German or German-American (with perhaps wounded pride), you seem pretty disorganised in your commentary of foul language. One wonders where to start to make corrections to such a disparate and disorganised) set of 'comments'. A few corrections (but not of your petty sort):

-- If the potential European "super state" becomes a "totalitarian" one, with political power monopolised by 1 party (or person), then you might have a point. It's a bit of a stretch to see that in the present. The article focused on rising authoritarian states in the present, and declared the future unknown. I presume that you know the difference between authoritarian and totalitarian.

-- The concept of "modernity" was used in the context of choices, between different 'economic/political governance models', that other smaller (mainly Third World) countries face. Liberal democracy is only one of those choices. A more precise definition for the concept is not needed here, although that may be hard to fathom for a teutonic mind. The proper balance between flexibility (in one's definitions) and principled steadfastness is a delicate thing.

-- It is remarkable that you can think today that "the Soviet threat" had nothing to do with the decisionmaking in Japan at the end of World War 2 and in its immediate aftermath. Perhaps you think that the Japanese leaders did not have maps, and that Stalin grabbing parts of northern Japan in the Kuriles islands (in the last few weeks of the war) came as a complete surprise to them?? This subject can not be properly dealt with in a short paragraph. The point is that one can sensibly use a reference source like Wikipedia ONLY IF one has received a decent education and knows what to look for and how to put it in a larger 'big picture'.

-- An intelligent person would immediately understand that the fact that (in your words) "East Germany was ALREADY occupied by soviet forces" only strengthens the point made in the article, i.e. it magnified the Soviet threat and induced societal restructuring in the rest of Germany. If a large chunk of Irak were today "permanently occupied" by (say) Turkey or Iran, that would surely help to 'concentrate' Iraki minds too. Although, them being mainly Arabs and Kurds, one can not be sure that they would be willing to "restructure" in the same sensible way as the Germans (and Japanese) did.

P.S. It is laudable that you "support the Flemish Community's quest for independence" (from Belgium). But, your totally false 'analogy' with the "Free State of the Congo etc...." suggests that you have little understanding of the (marginal) 'Flemish role' in past Belgian colonisation, and suggests perhaps also a 'blind spot' w.r.t the nature of German political culture before WW2.

Patently ridiculous

Submitted by sonomaca on Sat, 2007-08-04 19:24.

Russia is in the throes of demographic collapse.  Its population is shrinking at the rate of 5% per decade.  It's a declining power not a rising one.

China faces the same problem.  It's getting old before it gets rich.  China's population is older than America's, its fertility (at 1.75) is far lower, and its working age population will peak in 2015.  The facts demonstrate that China will never even come close to challenging the United States.

India is the only large country besides the US which will be a great power 100 years from now.  It's fertility, at 2.8, will sustain its growth over time.  And guess what?  India is a liberal democracy!

An asset of democracy is

Submitted by Geraldo on Sat, 2007-08-04 09:35.

An asset of democracy is that it works for states as a randomizer.

When an authoritarian state takes a path that is doomed it is hard to reverse it.

We had many exemples of that:

Iraq and Saddam. USSR and the comunism. Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe. North Korea and its comunist's dinasty.

Sometimes the ordeal may prove long but the end is granted.

In democracy, with its freedom and freespeech, where people can be part of the political process, this is unlike to happens. If the leadership proves not well it will be changed. It has some drawbacks, as the lack of long term policies but it saves from long term doomed policies. Or when the polls give victory to a bad guy. This happend in Argentina not many years ago. But, as I say, you have the governement you desserve.

So the real problem is the internal front, where we have two problems:

The lack of democracy in EU instituitions.

A for too long doomed path, multiculturalism & al, that have to be fixed.

 

doom doom doom

Submitted by Armor on Sat, 2007-08-04 14:36.

Geraldo said: "The lack of democracy in EU institutions."

The EU institutions are simply doing the administrative tasks that are assigned them. They do not have a political agenda of their own. It may be irrelevant to look for democracy in the EU. The EU parliament does not have a big say in determining the political objectives. When we complain that European governments are forcing the EU on us, we should put the blame on our own governments and institutions, our marx media, our fake intellectuals, not on the EU.

The truth is that our European democracies are no longer democracies. Our anti-elites are destroying Europe by the means of mass immigration. Maybe democracy did not work better in the past. World War one was another good example of the anti-elites hurting European peoples. The European population did not want war. It was imposed on us by the governments and other institutions. Today, Europeans do not approve of population substitution. It is nevertheless imposed on us, and there has never been so much propaganda in the media. That is proof enough that we do not have democracy.

For democracy to work, it is not enough to have the right institutions. For example, when elections are organized in some muslim countries, people simply vote for muslim dictatorship. Democracy will not work unless people believe in it a little. Unfortunately, tenants of the "leftist" or "liberal" ideology are not democratically-minded. They have hijacked our institutions and probably do not plan to return them in the near future.

Geraldo: " An asset of democracy is that it works for states as a randomizer.
When an authoritarian state takes a path that is doomed it is hard to reverse it.
We had many exemples of that:
Iraq and Saddam. USSR and the comunism. Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe. North Korea and its comunist's dinasty.
Sometimes the ordeal may prove long but the end is granted. "

What's happening now in the West is much worse than Russia's Soviet experiment. At the end of the communist period, the Russians were still in Russia. But how many Europeans will be left in 50 years from now?

The Western system is much more flexible than the Soviet system. But it may be a source of strength for the looney ideology of the left. That ideology is clearly doomed. It is destroying itself at the same time it destroys the West. But after reflection, I would rather see a big crash and a civil war in 2017, than a very gradual irreparable destruction made possible by the flexibility of our fake democratic system.

Geraldo: "you have the governement you desserve"

No you don't. Governments are not always representative. In a dictatorship, dissenters go to jail. In Western Europe, dissenters are kept out of television and public institutions.

Missing the mark

Submitted by marcfrans on Fri, 2007-08-03 23:13.

@ dragoon 1688

 

It is important to make a distinction between internal and external threats to liberal democracy.  The article is concerned with geopolitics, i.e. power relations between the world's great powers.  It is not concerned with INTERNAL (cultural) threats to democray, but rather with the eternal human struggle between authoritarianism and 'liberalism' (in the sense of political freedom). 

There is little doubt that "liberalism" (in the sense of a social and cultural movement), as it has evolved in many western countries over the past half century or so in the direction of (in your words) "a deranged multiculturalism and internationalism" is an INTERNAL cultural threat to the survival of democracy.  However, geopolitics is not about the internal cultural 'wars' within Western civilisation, but rather about the power relations among established great nations or powers in the world.    

The term "liberalism" can mean many things, and its 'common' meaning has changed dramatically over the past century.  A hundred years ago, "liberalism" was in the forefront of the struggle for individual freedom and for democratic governance structures (or political systems), and mainly in opposition to socialism.  That is still largely the 'European' understanding of the term.   By contrast, your usage of the term "liberalism" as largely a social and cultural movement is a very 'American' and more contemporary understanding of the term.  You are certainly right that liberalism in that specific sense is a great internal threat to the survival of democracy, or perhaps an indication of its transition to forms of "illiberal democracy" (in the words of Fareed Zakaria).  If western liberal democracy does not survive internally, then the geopolitical angle becomes a moot point.   But, if it can survive in our era then the geopolitical threat from authoritarian great powers becomes very relevant, as it has frequently in the past.

Yes, most of what you say is

Submitted by dragoon1688 on Sat, 2007-08-04 05:12.

Yes, most of what you say is right. I was too hurried to make all those distinctions. I would consider myself a liberal, but in the 19th century sense of the word (Back then all liberals were patriots). Perhaps on the continent, the word "liberal" retains something of its original meaning, but in the UK it is corrupted beyond remedy.

I suppose my point was that, in your words "the geopolitical angle is becoming a moot point." If we can't preserve liberty and order at home, then we certainly don't stand a chance against external threats. That's why this article irritated me so much.

Moreover, I grow tired of those who are constantly "raising the alarm" about 'autocratic Russia." Russia, as a European Christian civilisation, is a natural ally for the West, regardless of its authoritarian tendencies. We need to get past this Neo-Con nonsense which divides the world according to ideology. Russia is now full of Christian conservatives who would love to ally themselves with like-minded Europeans (I know a few personally). Let us agree to disagree with them on the question of strong state vs. limited government and focus on the common cause.

Now, China, there's a real threat for you. Another reason to seek alliance with Russia, rather than continue bloviating about Russia's "backsliding into authoritarianism"

Re: Geopolitics...

Submitted by missingmyumlauts on Sat, 2007-08-04 03:56.

Interesting article, reminds me strongly of Sir A.C. Doyle's plots, especially his 'Silver blaze' story on:"... the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.".

Although the author hails from Belgium (personal disclosure, I strongly support Flemish Community's quest for independence), he penned a decent-sized article for one of the leading European Conservative blogs on dangers of totalitarian state & war without even mentioning A Very Obvious "Major Authoritarian ‘capitalist’ state(s)", clearly visible from his living room window, namely --- European Union Superstate---.

Wow. What a glaring oversight.

"As a result, the world is witnessing today the return of major authoritarian ‘capitalist’ states, particularly in China and Russia, which can represent an alternative path to ‘modernity’ for a growing number of countries elsewhere in the world."

Sir, what's exactly your definition of "modernity"?

Alert: Crappy Fact-Checking & Subsequent Poor Writing ahead:

"For instance, the previous totalitarian capitalist great powers, Germany and Japan, were crushed in war and threatened by soviet power, and subsequently lent themselves to major restructuring and democratization."

Petty: 'Soviet' = usually requires upper case, say ...like 'EU'.

Not so petty: Japan was bombed into submission and was afterwards 'formaly' occupied by US until 1951, you may want to bookmark Wikipedia for the future reference i.e. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occupied_Japan ,

The aftermath of war in Japan had nothing to do with Soviet Union or some unspecified threat, it was already discussed and agreed in Yalta, the restructuring of Japanese society was necessary in order to accomplish 3 key issues:
1. Disarmarment
2. Liberalization
3. Democratization

Again, USSR menace has (or had) nothing to do with profound changes in Japanese society,taking into account strong presence of US military (and bases) in Japan, from 1945 till today.

Crap.

On (West + East) Germany:

How can you say 'threatened' taking into account that Eastern Germany was already permanently occupied by Soviet forces, and that the other part "... to major restructuring and democratization".
West Germany was occupied by Allied Forces, instrumental in instigating necessary transformation of West Germany into free democratic society.

Your turn of phrase would be similar to history book saying..."Free State of Congo lending itself to major Belgium restructuring from 1876 to 1908".

Most people tend to forget that Germany's unification did not happened long ago, was in October 1990. Zero hour and seventeen years later, compared to the USA, this is democracy still learning to walk.

Or maybe, for you dear author, Stasi and Honecker were already in charge of rapid democratization?

Not exactly BJ's finest hour.

TS Eliot on Liberalism

Submitted by atheling on Fri, 2007-08-03 22:34.

"By destroying traditional social habits of the people, by dissolving their natural collective consciousness into individual constituents, by licensing the opinions of the most foolish, by substituting instruction for education, by encouraging cleverness rather than wisdom, the upstart rather than the qualified, by fostering a notion of "getting on" to which the alternative is a hopeless apathy, Liberalism can prepare the way for that which is its own negation: the artificial, mechanised or brutalised control which is a desperate remedy for its chaos."

wrong wrong wrong!

Submitted by dragoon1688 on Fri, 2007-08-03 20:39.

the greatest threat to liberal democracies these days is not from terrorism, or ascendant undemocratic nations, but from liberalism itself. Or shall we say 21st century liberalism, which denies everything that makes ordered and free political life possible in favour of deranged multiculturalism and internationalism. In order to have democracy, you need to have a Nation, defined by history, culture and values, whose permanent interests are the concern of every citizen. No nation, no democracy (see former Yugoslavia, former USSR, former Iraq if you have doubts) In order to have liberty, people have to be ready join together to resist the government when it seeks to usurp too much power. If your country is full of squabbling ethno-religious groups, each angling for power and influence, then the state will learn to play mistrustful groups against one another, and thereby consolidate its power. Hence: no nation, no liberty.

The greatest threat to liberal democracy is from immigration and multiculturalism.