Some early optimism arose when it became known that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad handed the Swiss Ambassador inTehran a letter addressed to US President George Bush. Since the unprecedented occupation of the US’ embassy in 1980 (even the Nazis and the Communists respected diplomatic immunity) Iran and the US have no direct contact and communicate through the good offices of the Swiss. Wishful thinking recalled US-Chinese enmity and the careful steps that culminated in the normalization of relations in 1972. Quite correctly, a direct note was seen as an Iranian opening “tit” (given that the Mullahs caused the original the rupture) to be followed by an American “tat.”

To bring about a rapprochement is an Iranian interest no matter what her nuclear plans might be. Regardless of the situation in Iraq and the disagreement among the Perms of the Security Council, it is a rational assumption that these factors will not furnish effective protection until Iran can really get her bomb. A settlement now would give Iran concessions and also access to civilian nuclear technology to be of utility once the oil runs out. Should she be committed to nuclear armament, a rational pursuit of this (not necessarily sound) goal would include creating a security cover for the project’s duration. Making an agreement to preclude preventive action coupled to the violation of its provisions should be the strategy of choice.

However, those who a saw the letter as a chance for the political settlement of the pending security issue have been misled by their hopes vested in what they regarded to be a rational step – and by ignoring the psychology of the sender. Arguably, the decision makers in Tehran see the world and the forces that make it run through a set of filters (religious and national prejudice and misinterpreted lessons of recent history) that prevent them to use a risk-minimizing indirect approach to their objective.

For one thing, Ahmadinejad’s note which is between a reprimand and a lecture, is the kind of missed opportunity that makes the rise of future opportunities less likely. Any small actual concession by Ahmadinejad would have been publicly exaggerated by an Administration that needs to create the impression of being able to score. Thereby the extent of the response would have been substantial. The way things are made to stand, the letter does more damage than just missing a chance. The letter – whose reasonableness and propriety is likely to be unquestioned by its authors – does not in itself deepen the crisis that is rising. However, this crisis if not treated, has by now a dynamic of its own. This quality makes the ditch deepen if not consciously counteracted. Tehran’s note is certainly a failure if its author expected it to become a pillar in a bridge to be constructed across the growing divide.

As things seem to be, the letter amounts to psychological warfare through the mail and does more than putting a stone on the path to a political solution. For one thing,Washington’s anything-but-arbitrarily derived suspicions concerning Iran’s inclination to misuse diplomacy be it public or private, direct or indirect, will be re-enforced. Countries not unalterably opposed to the US will have one more piece of evidence suggesting that Tehran is, mildly put, “difficult.” Naturally the message and its rejection by Washington will mobilize those states, leaders and organizations that are pathologically hostile to America. The blemish of this support is that Iran already has the unqualified support of these for they cheer anything that is bad for the United States. Not even the Anti-Americans United can give more than 100% of approval.

On the basis of what is known about its content, one is actually led to wonder about Tehran’s purpose. Has the sender tried to gain public opinion points by forcing Washington to reject what it will represent as a serious “démarche”? Generally it is pointed out that the letter hardly even skirts the central nuclear issue. One can add that the reference to eliminating the “Zionist Entity” confirms the impression that a hidden agenda is being served. The topic is not only provocative but also irrelevant to the core of the dispute. Making consciously a detour to drag a divisive matter artificially into the “discussion” (along with a number of further meant-to-be-offensive non-sequiturs) would be the way to assure a rebuff. Or has Ahmadinejad aimed his sermon not at Bush but at the anti-progress, anti-US, anti-democratic forces outside of Iran? If so, through the publicity the note was predestined to get he reached more of these than any five-hour diatribe by Castro or Chavez could.

A reference has been made in the foregoing to the frame of mind of the letter’s authors. By all evidence the “Weltanschauung” of Iran’s leaders is shaped by a concept that assumes an ultimate clash between good (they) and evil (such as in Great Satan) ending with their inevitable victory. Here it should be noted that Ahmadinejad believes that the coming of the Mahdi is near. In Western terms this translates into the return of the Messiah and the end of the world. In this case the letter does not represent a clumsy incantation to avoid war by converting a misguided Bush. Much rather its purpose was in this case to prepare favorably pre-conditions for the anticipated struggle. In the same vein Tehran might be sincere in that it believes what it claims which is, in the case of individuals, a serious disorder. No matter what one is led to believe, the conclusions dim the chances of a political settlement. Only the (still far fetched) firm warning of the united Great Powers has a chance to stop Iran’s handstands at the rim of the abyss.

Would this assuredly help? Not necessarily. Certain of God’s support, the warning threats of the United Perms measured with the world’s yardstick is not necessarily dissuasive to those who rely on Heaven’s gauge.

Someone being frightened is depicted as a negative trait. In doing so the term is being confused with “cowardice.” As every biologist can tell, fear is a basic and highly useful instinct. It contributes to the survival of those species that are able to develop strategies for the avoidance of ruinous risks. Man should fear God say the religious. Emperor William II said that Germany fears God and nothing else. Albeit not single handedly, he then carelessly took the West into the unnecessary WW I – which he lost. Had Hitler, or for that matter, Saddam Hussein, had a portion of self doubt and known a bit of fear they (or their successors) would still be in power. Ahmadinejad is fearless and his courage cannot be doubted. Time will tell whether this courage is the bravery of one who knows the calculated dangers of his undertaking or whether his valor is coupled to not understanding the components of his situation. In the latter case, while “The Letter” goes “back to the sender,” it is appropriate to close with a paraphrased proverb. The Greeks thought that if the Gods want to destroy someone they only have to take away his common sense.