George Handlery about the week that was. The Talker-in-Chief and “Copenhagen”. Michelangelo and American foreign policy. The problems of war time Democratic Presidents.  Open societies and their wars. Is Iran demonstratively hiding what it does not have? Admit the failure of diplomacy?

1. Copenhagen. All talk of failure. Wrongly. Many “good things” have happened. Consider this: many people attending were enabled to expand their horizon by travel. And that on someone else’ expense. (You will guess the donor.) Plenty of opportunity to profile the otherwise nameless that claimed to be in a state of uncompromising outrage. That created good gut feelings because fury is, in some circles, a moral pedestal. Accordingly, it was possible to riot and smash and to express thereby ethical superiority. Doing so was even fun although normally, acknowledged “virtue” requires that pleasure be relinquished. So, those on the streets voiced their opinions by smashing things for the camera – “look Mom, I am on TV!” Meanwhile, inside, the official participants of the conference held significant speeches during which the listeners did not listen because they were busy being asleep. For the delegates – all fearless fighters against vice – of otherwise forgotten countries, excellent photo ops and a great chance to claim risk-free rank and status was the reward.

Some of the rewards are valuable. “Third Worlders” will get money from where pious funds of atonement set up for such purposes always come from. Meanwhile, the donors, even though tree hugging would have been cheaper, can claim enrichment through having done “something good”. That scores even when one cannot be certain what that something might be. Except, of course that the money given to ameliorate guilt feeling consumed as a luxury will be handed to governments. These shall direct the money into local projects to save the planet. As a result two further “good things” will occur. Chronic guilt feelings will be ameliorated and governing third world elites will be enabled to perk up welfare. Mainly their own. Naturally, the dough will be transferred while silently consenting that its use must not be controlled. Doing otherwise would limit sovereignty and that, as we know, amounts to “neo colonialism”. That is an especially reprehensible misdemeanor when practiced to the detriment of dictatorial cleptocrats. The money thrown at the problem will be of use. To the makers of luxury cars. Left alone, the climate will develop the way nature dictates. The warming will not abate; however, the consciences of the donors will cool. A loser at Copenhagen appears to be America’s “Talker-in-Chief”. He swung the magic wand and declared that the time to talk is over. After that – and this in itself is not Obama’s fault – nothing much happened.  Except for producing an agreement to continue to talk.

2. Obama desires to make his foreign policy personally. The problem: he is inexperienced. OK, initially Michelangelo, too, lacked experience in painting Sistine Chapels. That condition lasted until the structure was built and he could lay hands on that famous ceiling. From then on, clearly, the action was made successful by applying talent and the right concept. Even so, Michelangelo re-did parts of the project as he went along. Obama seems to wear tainted glasses. These make it difficult to judge the product and the result, paired with some conceit, makes it hard to have a second go at whatever does not pan out right.

3. Without having asked for it, Obama is conducting a war or, depending on your definition, “wars”. The primary challenge of the conflict is that it is asymmetrical. So, the winner will triumph because he had the greater endurance. The primary factor, unlike in conventional wars, is not more and better technology and those “large” divisions that Napoleon said God is supporting. This American war, seconded feebly by allies, presents therefore a challenge that is mainly one of domestic politics. To a significant degree, this conflict is decided on the home front. Prevailing there gives political mobilization and its maintenance -expressed by the preparedness to bear recurrent sacrifices- a decisive role. Regarding this staying-power aspect of the war, a Vietnam parallel, in this case not one that is pulled by its hair, might be of help.

Now, as well as then, a Democrat had to conduct an inherited war of attrition. Johnson, as well as Obama, lead a party that would rather buy a bad peace than win by tenacity. The party is, unlike in 1941-45, committed through its relativistic ethics, in a provincial way to “peace” as soon as the going gets tough. To the misfortune of such presidents, it is his opposition that would rather win than lose. Furthermore, it is the opposition that operates on the basis of a rational evaluation of the origins of the conflict and its stakes. Theoretically, with the help of the sane and personally loyal elements of his party and the Republican opposition, a solid majority for staying in the war for the duration would be imaginable.

Alas, what is imaginable is often not makeable. The essential coalition needed to prevail faces hurdles. The party that has ideological objections to fighting for anything at any time has a commensurate internal agenda. Its pursuit will deepen the dividing line between it and the opposition. Fighting on the domestic front will reduce, understandably but also myopically, the will of the Republicans to do too much to save the skin of a Democratic president. The other side of the coin is that a Democratic President must be careful not to adopt the foreign policy of the party that he grapples with on domestic issues. The upshot is that to win in a protracted conflict, the Democrat in the White House needs to make a foreign policy that is associated with Republicanism. That will go against the grain of his party. Steering this line would also upgrade the credibility of the GOP in the election that is always around the corner, while the President needs to prevail over them in domestic matters. An added negative is that a question might arise. Since a Democrat makes Republican foreign policy, why not just empower a Republican President who can do the same with more consistency.. Accomplishing all these contradictory things demands that the rubber band of compromise be stretched to a point at which it snaps.

4. In the case of open societies, an extended military engagement’s costs are badly stomached. Exceptions are cases when the struggle takes place along their borders or upon their territory. A perfect illustration is Pearl Harbor and the Pacific phase of WW2. Accordingly, McArthur, embellished by his corncob pipe, said before he went on board of that sub “I shall return”. He did not say, “I shall seek a deal to end this misunderstanding through international mediation”.

Here the globalization of conflicts brings disadvantages. Contemporary threats are independent of ones geographic location while society’s perception continues to be an old fashioned territorial one. Thus, if the threat is not unmistakably aimed at the “homeland”, the danger can be redefined to fit into a category that allows it to be ignored. The schooling in compromise that determines conflict resolution and politics at home, is giving rise to assumptions that are projected on ideological conflicts that are waged as a total war by the “other side”. A quickly unfolding peace movement, representing the confusion regarding the issues and the nature of the challenge, will exploit this inclination and create paralysis.

5. Let us all wonder why Iran insists on hiding cards she claims not to have until caught, when she pretends that she has nothing to hide?

6. After his anointment, President Obama extended his hand, possibly even his open arms, to Iran. The action seems defensible and the attempt’s motives plausible. The many months since then produced Iranian actions and verbal reactions that suggest that the extended hand is and will remain empty and that the gesture will not be returned. Obviously, Tehran is not interested to use a good opportunity to normalize relations with a new administration and to accept a compromise in its favor. This regardless of the begging of the international community as well as key, till now colluding states that have not felt that Iran’s project constitutes a general threat. Some of these have protected Iran because they pursued their advantages and because they like to exploit anti-Americanism wherever possible. It is time to think aloud about the failure of every form of conventional diplomacy. Additionally, deterrence does not deter the fanatic -because he is a fanatic. Quite likely, the hither handling of the situation, heaping compromise proposals upon retreats and following up last warnings with newer admonitions make an impression. Even rational parties will draw conclusions from the fudging. In doing so they discover in it an encouraging sign to continue undaunted. An appropriate summary of the situation is that only physical interdiction will achieve the only solution of the crisis, namely a non-nuclear Iran. That goal is one that is, ultimately and regardless of delays and equivocation, non-negotiable.